* use certmagic for more extensible/robust ACME cert handling * accept TOS based on config option Signed-off-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net> Co-authored-by: zeripath <art27@cantab.net> Co-authored-by: Lauris BH <lauris@nix.lv>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			210 lines
		
	
	
		
			4.9 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
		
			Vendored
		
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			210 lines
		
	
	
		
			4.9 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
		
			Vendored
		
	
	
	
| package dns
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| 
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| import (
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| 	"crypto"
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| 	"crypto/dsa"
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| 	"crypto/ecdsa"
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| 	"crypto/rsa"
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| 	"encoding/binary"
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| 	"math/big"
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| 	"strings"
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| 	"time"
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| )
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| 
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| // Sign signs a dns.Msg. It fills the signature with the appropriate data.
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| // The SIG record should have the SignerName, KeyTag, Algorithm, Inception
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| // and Expiration set.
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| func (rr *SIG) Sign(k crypto.Signer, m *Msg) ([]byte, error) {
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| 	if k == nil {
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| 		return nil, ErrPrivKey
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| 	}
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| 	if rr.KeyTag == 0 || len(rr.SignerName) == 0 || rr.Algorithm == 0 {
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| 		return nil, ErrKey
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	rr.Hdr = RR_Header{Name: ".", Rrtype: TypeSIG, Class: ClassANY, Ttl: 0}
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| 	rr.OrigTtl, rr.TypeCovered, rr.Labels = 0, 0, 0
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| 
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| 	buf := make([]byte, m.Len()+Len(rr))
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| 	mbuf, err := m.PackBuffer(buf)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return nil, err
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| 	}
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| 	if &buf[0] != &mbuf[0] {
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| 		return nil, ErrBuf
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| 	}
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| 	off, err := PackRR(rr, buf, len(mbuf), nil, false)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return nil, err
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| 	}
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| 	buf = buf[:off:cap(buf)]
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| 
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| 	hash, ok := AlgorithmToHash[rr.Algorithm]
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| 	if !ok {
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| 		return nil, ErrAlg
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	hasher := hash.New()
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| 	// Write SIG rdata
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| 	hasher.Write(buf[len(mbuf)+1+2+2+4+2:])
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| 	// Write message
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| 	hasher.Write(buf[:len(mbuf)])
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| 
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| 	signature, err := sign(k, hasher.Sum(nil), hash, rr.Algorithm)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return nil, err
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	rr.Signature = toBase64(signature)
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| 
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| 	buf = append(buf, signature...)
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| 	if len(buf) > int(^uint16(0)) {
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| 		return nil, ErrBuf
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| 	}
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| 	// Adjust sig data length
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| 	rdoff := len(mbuf) + 1 + 2 + 2 + 4
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| 	rdlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[rdoff:])
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| 	rdlen += uint16(len(signature))
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| 	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(buf[rdoff:], rdlen)
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| 	// Adjust additional count
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| 	adc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[10:])
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| 	adc++
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| 	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(buf[10:], adc)
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| 	return buf, nil
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| }
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| 
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| // Verify validates the message buf using the key k.
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| // It's assumed that buf is a valid message from which rr was unpacked.
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| func (rr *SIG) Verify(k *KEY, buf []byte) error {
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| 	if k == nil {
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| 		return ErrKey
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| 	}
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| 	if rr.KeyTag == 0 || len(rr.SignerName) == 0 || rr.Algorithm == 0 {
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| 		return ErrKey
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	var hash crypto.Hash
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| 	switch rr.Algorithm {
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| 	case DSA, RSASHA1:
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| 		hash = crypto.SHA1
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| 	case RSASHA256, ECDSAP256SHA256:
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| 		hash = crypto.SHA256
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| 	case ECDSAP384SHA384:
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| 		hash = crypto.SHA384
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| 	case RSASHA512:
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| 		hash = crypto.SHA512
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| 	default:
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| 		return ErrAlg
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| 	}
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| 	hasher := hash.New()
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| 
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| 	buflen := len(buf)
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| 	qdc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[4:])
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| 	anc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[6:])
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| 	auc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[8:])
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| 	adc := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[10:])
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| 	offset := headerSize
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| 	var err error
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| 	for i := uint16(0); i < qdc && offset < buflen; i++ {
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| 		_, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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| 		if err != nil {
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| 			return err
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| 		}
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| 		// Skip past Type and Class
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| 		offset += 2 + 2
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| 	}
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| 	for i := uint16(1); i < anc+auc+adc && offset < buflen; i++ {
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| 		_, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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| 		if err != nil {
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| 			return err
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| 		}
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| 		// Skip past Type, Class and TTL
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| 		offset += 2 + 2 + 4
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| 		if offset+1 >= buflen {
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| 			continue
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| 		}
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| 		rdlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[offset:])
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| 		offset += 2
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| 		offset += int(rdlen)
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| 	}
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| 	if offset >= buflen {
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| 		return &Error{err: "overflowing unpacking signed message"}
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// offset should be just prior to SIG
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| 	bodyend := offset
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| 	// owner name SHOULD be root
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| 	_, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return err
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| 	}
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| 	// Skip Type, Class, TTL, RDLen
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| 	offset += 2 + 2 + 4 + 2
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| 	sigstart := offset
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| 	// Skip Type Covered, Algorithm, Labels, Original TTL
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| 	offset += 2 + 1 + 1 + 4
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| 	if offset+4+4 >= buflen {
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| 		return &Error{err: "overflow unpacking signed message"}
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| 	}
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| 	expire := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[offset:])
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| 	offset += 4
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| 	incept := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[offset:])
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| 	offset += 4
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| 	now := uint32(time.Now().Unix())
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| 	if now < incept || now > expire {
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| 		return ErrTime
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| 	}
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| 	// Skip key tag
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| 	offset += 2
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| 	var signername string
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| 	signername, offset, err = UnpackDomainName(buf, offset)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return err
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| 	}
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| 	// If key has come from the DNS name compression might
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| 	// have mangled the case of the name
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| 	if !strings.EqualFold(signername, k.Header().Name) {
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| 		return &Error{err: "signer name doesn't match key name"}
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| 	}
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| 	sigend := offset
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| 	hasher.Write(buf[sigstart:sigend])
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| 	hasher.Write(buf[:10])
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| 	hasher.Write([]byte{
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| 		byte((adc - 1) << 8),
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| 		byte(adc - 1),
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| 	})
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| 	hasher.Write(buf[12:bodyend])
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| 
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| 	hashed := hasher.Sum(nil)
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| 	sig := buf[sigend:]
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| 	switch k.Algorithm {
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| 	case DSA:
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| 		pk := k.publicKeyDSA()
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| 		sig = sig[1:]
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| 		r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:len(sig)/2])
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| 		s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[len(sig)/2:])
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| 		if pk != nil {
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| 			if dsa.Verify(pk, hashed, r, s) {
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| 				return nil
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| 			}
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| 			return ErrSig
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| 		}
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| 	case RSASHA1, RSASHA256, RSASHA512:
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| 		pk := k.publicKeyRSA()
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| 		if pk != nil {
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| 			return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pk, hash, hashed, sig)
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| 		}
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| 	case ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384:
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| 		pk := k.publicKeyECDSA()
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| 		r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:len(sig)/2])
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| 		s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[len(sig)/2:])
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| 		if pk != nil {
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| 			if ecdsa.Verify(pk, hashed, r, s) {
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| 				return nil
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| 			}
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| 			return ErrSig
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| 		}
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| 	}
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| 	return ErrKeyAlg
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| }
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