Migrate from U2F to Webauthn Co-authored-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net> Co-authored-by: 6543 <6543@obermui.de> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
257 lines
12 KiB
Go
Vendored
257 lines
12 KiB
Go
Vendored
package protocol
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2"
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)
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var minAuthDataLength = 37
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// Authenticators respond to Relying Party requests by returning an object derived from the
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// AuthenticatorResponse interface. See §5.2. Authenticator Responses
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// https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#iface-authenticatorresponse
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type AuthenticatorResponse struct {
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// From the spec https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#dom-authenticatorresponse-clientdatajson
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// This attribute contains a JSON serialization of the client data passed to the authenticator
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// by the client in its call to either create() or get().
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ClientDataJSON URLEncodedBase64 `json:"clientDataJSON"`
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}
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// AuthenticatorData From §6.1 of the spec.
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// The authenticator data structure encodes contextual bindings made by the authenticator. These bindings
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// are controlled by the authenticator itself, and derive their trust from the WebAuthn Relying Party's
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// assessment of the security properties of the authenticator. In one extreme case, the authenticator
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// may be embedded in the client, and its bindings may be no more trustworthy than the client data.
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// At the other extreme, the authenticator may be a discrete entity with high-security hardware and
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// software, connected to the client over a secure channel. In both cases, the Relying Party receives
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// the authenticator data in the same format, and uses its knowledge of the authenticator to make
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// trust decisions.
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//
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// The authenticator data, at least during attestation, contains the Public Key that the RP stores
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// and will associate with the user attempting to register.
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type AuthenticatorData struct {
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RPIDHash []byte `json:"rpid"`
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Flags AuthenticatorFlags `json:"flags"`
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Counter uint32 `json:"sign_count"`
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AttData AttestedCredentialData `json:"att_data"`
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ExtData []byte `json:"ext_data"`
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}
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type AttestedCredentialData struct {
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AAGUID []byte `json:"aaguid"`
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CredentialID []byte `json:"credential_id"`
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// The raw credential public key bytes received from the attestation data
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CredentialPublicKey []byte `json:"public_key"`
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}
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// AuthenticatorAttachment https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#platform-attachment
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type AuthenticatorAttachment string
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const (
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// Platform - A platform authenticator is attached using a client device-specific transport, called
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// platform attachment, and is usually not removable from the client device. A public key credential
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// bound to a platform authenticator is called a platform credential.
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Platform AuthenticatorAttachment = "platform"
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// CrossPlatform A roaming authenticator is attached using cross-platform transports, called
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// cross-platform attachment. Authenticators of this class are removable from, and can "roam"
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// among, client devices. A public key credential bound to a roaming authenticator is called a
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// roaming credential.
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CrossPlatform AuthenticatorAttachment = "cross-platform"
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)
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// Authenticators may implement various transports for communicating with clients. This enumeration defines
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// hints as to how clients might communicate with a particular authenticator in order to obtain an assertion
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// for a specific credential. Note that these hints represent the WebAuthn Relying Party's best belief as to
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// how an authenticator may be reached. A Relying Party may obtain a list of transports hints from some
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// attestation statement formats or via some out-of-band mechanism; it is outside the scope of this
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// specification to define that mechanism.
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// See §5.10.4. Authenticator Transport https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#transport
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type AuthenticatorTransport string
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const (
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// USB The authenticator should transport information over USB
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USB AuthenticatorTransport = "usb"
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// NFC The authenticator should transport information over Near Field Communication Protocol
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NFC AuthenticatorTransport = "nfc"
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// BLE The authenticator should transport information over Bluetooth
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BLE AuthenticatorTransport = "ble"
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// Internal the client should use an internal source like a TPM or SE
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Internal AuthenticatorTransport = "internal"
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)
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// A WebAuthn Relying Party may require user verification for some of its operations but not for others,
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// and may use this type to express its needs.
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// See §5.10.6. User Verification Requirement Enumeration https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#userVerificationRequirement
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type UserVerificationRequirement string
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const (
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// VerificationRequired User verification is required to create/release a credential
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VerificationRequired UserVerificationRequirement = "required"
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// VerificationPreferred User verification is preferred to create/release a credential
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VerificationPreferred UserVerificationRequirement = "preferred" // This is the default
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// VerificationDiscouraged The authenticator should not verify the user for the credential
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VerificationDiscouraged UserVerificationRequirement = "discouraged"
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)
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// AuthenticatorFlags A byte of information returned during during ceremonies in the
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// authenticatorData that contains bits that give us information about the
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// whether the user was present and/or verified during authentication, and whether
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// there is attestation or extension data present. Bit 0 is the least significant bit.
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type AuthenticatorFlags byte
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// The bits that do not have flags are reserved for future use.
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const (
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// FlagUserPresent Bit 00000001 in the byte sequence. Tells us if user is present
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FlagUserPresent AuthenticatorFlags = 1 << iota // Referred to as UP
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_ // Reserved
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// FlagUserVerified Bit 00000100 in the byte sequence. Tells us if user is verified
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// by the authenticator using a biometric or PIN
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FlagUserVerified // Referred to as UV
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_ // Reserved
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_ // Reserved
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_ // Reserved
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// FlagAttestedCredentialData Bit 01000000 in the byte sequence. Indicates whether
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// the authenticator added attested credential data.
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FlagAttestedCredentialData // Referred to as AT
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// FlagHasExtension Bit 10000000 in the byte sequence. Indicates if the authenticator data has extensions.
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FlagHasExtensions // Referred to as ED
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)
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// UserPresent returns if the UP flag was set
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func (flag AuthenticatorFlags) UserPresent() bool {
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return (flag & FlagUserPresent) == FlagUserPresent
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}
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// UserVerified returns if the UV flag was set
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func (flag AuthenticatorFlags) UserVerified() bool {
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return (flag & FlagUserVerified) == FlagUserVerified
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}
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// HasAttestedCredentialData returns if the AT flag was set
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func (flag AuthenticatorFlags) HasAttestedCredentialData() bool {
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return (flag & FlagAttestedCredentialData) == FlagAttestedCredentialData
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}
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// HasExtensions returns if the ED flag was set
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func (flag AuthenticatorFlags) HasExtensions() bool {
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return (flag & FlagHasExtensions) == FlagHasExtensions
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}
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// Unmarshal will take the raw Authenticator Data and marshalls it into AuthenticatorData for further validation.
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// The authenticator data has a compact but extensible encoding. This is desired since authenticators can be
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// devices with limited capabilities and low power requirements, with much simpler software stacks than the client platform.
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// The authenticator data structure is a byte array of 37 bytes or more, and is laid out in this table:
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// https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#table-authData
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func (a *AuthenticatorData) Unmarshal(rawAuthData []byte) error {
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if minAuthDataLength > len(rawAuthData) {
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err := ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("Authenticator data length too short")
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info := fmt.Sprintf("Expected data greater than %d bytes. Got %d bytes\n", minAuthDataLength, len(rawAuthData))
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return err.WithInfo(info)
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}
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a.RPIDHash = rawAuthData[:32]
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a.Flags = AuthenticatorFlags(rawAuthData[32])
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a.Counter = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(rawAuthData[33:37])
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remaining := len(rawAuthData) - minAuthDataLength
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if a.Flags.HasAttestedCredentialData() {
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if len(rawAuthData) > minAuthDataLength {
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a.unmarshalAttestedData(rawAuthData)
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attDataLen := len(a.AttData.AAGUID) + 2 + len(a.AttData.CredentialID) + len(a.AttData.CredentialPublicKey)
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remaining = remaining - attDataLen
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} else {
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return ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("Attested credential flag set but data is missing")
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}
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} else {
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if !a.Flags.HasExtensions() && len(rawAuthData) != 37 {
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return ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("Attested credential flag not set")
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}
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}
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if a.Flags.HasExtensions() {
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if remaining != 0 {
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a.ExtData = rawAuthData[len(rawAuthData)-remaining:]
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remaining -= len(a.ExtData)
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} else {
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return ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("Extensions flag set but extensions data is missing")
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}
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}
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if remaining != 0 {
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return ErrBadRequest.WithDetails("Leftover bytes decoding AuthenticatorData")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// If Attestation Data is present, unmarshall that into the appropriate public key structure
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func (a *AuthenticatorData) unmarshalAttestedData(rawAuthData []byte) {
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a.AttData.AAGUID = rawAuthData[37:53]
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idLength := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rawAuthData[53:55])
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a.AttData.CredentialID = rawAuthData[55 : 55+idLength]
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a.AttData.CredentialPublicKey = unmarshalCredentialPublicKey(rawAuthData[55+idLength:])
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}
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// Unmarshall the credential's Public Key into CBOR encoding
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func unmarshalCredentialPublicKey(keyBytes []byte) []byte {
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var m interface{}
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cbor.Unmarshal(keyBytes, &m)
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rawBytes, _ := cbor.Marshal(m)
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return rawBytes
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}
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// ResidentKeyRequired - Require that the key be private key resident to the client device
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func ResidentKeyRequired() *bool {
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required := true
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return &required
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}
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// ResidentKeyUnrequired - Do not require that the private key be resident to the client device.
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func ResidentKeyUnrequired() *bool {
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required := false
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return &required
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}
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// Verify on AuthenticatorData handles Steps 9 through 12 for Registration
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// and Steps 11 through 14 for Assertion.
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func (a *AuthenticatorData) Verify(rpIdHash, appIDHash []byte, userVerificationRequired bool) error {
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// Registration Step 9 & Assertion Step 11
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// Verify that the RP ID hash in authData is indeed the SHA-256
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// hash of the RP ID expected by the RP.
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if !bytes.Equal(a.RPIDHash[:], rpIdHash) && !bytes.Equal(a.RPIDHash[:], appIDHash) {
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return ErrVerification.WithInfo(fmt.Sprintf("RP Hash mismatch. Expected %s and Received %s\n", a.RPIDHash, rpIdHash))
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}
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// Registration Step 10 & Assertion Step 12
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// Verify that the User Present bit of the flags in authData is set.
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if !a.Flags.UserPresent() {
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return ErrVerification.WithInfo(fmt.Sprintln("User presence flag not set by authenticator"))
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}
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// Registration Step 11 & Assertion Step 13
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// If user verification is required for this assertion, verify that
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// the User Verified bit of the flags in authData is set.
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if userVerificationRequired && !a.Flags.UserVerified() {
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return ErrVerification.WithInfo(fmt.Sprintln("User verification required but flag not set by authenticator"))
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}
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// Registration Step 12 & Assertion Step 14
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// Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults
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// and the authenticator extension outputs in the extensions in authData are as
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// expected, considering the client extension input values that were given as the
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// extensions option in the create() call. In particular, any extension identifier
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// values in the clientExtensionResults and the extensions in authData MUST be also be
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// present as extension identifier values in the extensions member of options, i.e., no
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// extensions are present that were not requested. In the general case, the meaning
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// of "are as expected" is specific to the Relying Party and which extensions are in use.
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// This is not yet fully implemented by the spec or by browsers
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return nil
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}
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